O artigo analisa a presença do discurso dos direitos humanos nos debates 
legal case that proposes to include in legal abortion anticipated parturition of anencephalous fetuses (ADPF 54).
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From abortion to embryonic stem cell research:
Biossociality and the constitution of subjects in the debate over human rights 1
Naara Luna
The present article analyzes how human rights discourse is inserted in legal struggles in Brazil in the context of the debate regarding research utilizing stem cells extracted from human embryos created during the in vitro fertilization process (IVF). We take as our principal material for analysis two cases in front of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court. These questions emerge from the field of reproductive health and end up in the legal realm due to the ethical problems that arise in several distinct contexts.
The article follows Rabinow's strategy for research, concentrating life practices as the most potent space for the development of new powers and forms of knowledge (1999, p. 137) , widening the scope of this strategy to take in juridical structures. Rabinow believes that, in the future, the new genetics will cease to be a biological metaphor for modern society, becoming instead a network in which identity terms and restricted spaces circulate and through which a new form of self-production -biosociality -will emerge. (Rabinow, 1999: 143) . With biosociality, nature will be molded around culture, understood and reworked through practical techniques. Nature will become artificial exactly as culture has become natural. With regards to the topic of the present article, biosociality will see human rights discourse appropriating beings who were earlier strictly defined by biology. New subjects will be constructed along this interface between biology and the law. 1 This article was constructed based on the presentation, "Do aborto à pesquisa com células-tronco embrionárias: o estatuto de embriões e de fetos e o debate sobre direitos humanos" given at the 8th Meeting of MERCOSUL Anthropology, workgoup #20, "Implementação de Direitos e Gestão da Vida" (The Creation of Life and the Implementation of Rights). Iit is part of the"Do aborto à pesquisa com células-tronco embrionárias: o estatuto de embriões e fetos e o debate sobre direitos humanos no Brasil" Project (From Abortion to Research with Embryonic Stem Cells: the status of fetuses and the debate over human rights in Brazil), which has received APQ1 funding from FAPERJ.
Associated with the concept of biosociality is that of biological citizenship, a term invented by Petryna (2004) , which means "a demand for, but limited access to, a form of social welfare based on medical, scientific, and legal criteria that recognize injury and compensate for it" (Petryna, 2004, p. 261) . The concept was created based upon the situation following the Chernobyl disaster, when people who had been affected by the reactor's radioactive fallout demanded that the Ukrainian government provide them with social assistance and compensation based on medical, scientific and legal criteria. Rose and Novas (2005) argue that a new kind of biological citizenship is taking form in this era of rapid biological and genomic discoveries and biotechnological fabrication and biomedicine. New subjectivities, new policies and new ethical standards are forming the biological citizens of today. Rose and Novas claim that biological citizenship has both individualizing and collectivizing trends. It is individualizing to the degree that individuals reform their relationship with themselves in terms of understanding their somatic individuality. It becomes collective when the new forms of biosociality and ethical technologies are grouped around categories of bodily vulnerability, somatic suffering and genetic risk and susceptibility (Rose and Novas, 2005) . Fassin believes that biolegitimacy creates the foundation of biocitizenship. Biolegitimacy is the "power of life as such" and is linked to the sense and worth given to life or to concrete lives, referring in this sense to the sacred character of life. The concept of biolegitimacy reflects upon how contemporary societies treat their members, to the value attributed to life in general and the worth attributed to lives in particular. Connecting the three concepts, the circulation of identity markers that is characteristic of biosociality is related to the revindications that emerge from a biological citizenship that is, in turn, founded upon biolegitimacy. These processes can be perceived throughout material analyzed below.
The present article thus seeks to debate the formation of new subjects and identities, looking in particular at those moments when new modes of recognition and legitimacy emerge from biomedical technologies as they are understood and absorbed by juridical technologies, particularly those technologies dealing with embryo production, anencephalic fetuses and stem cells and which recreate these beings in public spaces. In Rabinow's concept of biosociality, nature is recreated as culture. This is the very problem exposed by the public debates regarding research with stem cells extracted from human embryos and the abortion of anencephalic fetuses. By discussing the recognition of these new beings, these fetuses and embryos, juridical thought must ask itself if they are subjects of rights (Dworkin, 2003) to whom the law owes protection. Biological characteristics are emphasized in order to deny or attribute to these beings the status of personhood. This process illustrates the individualizing aspects of biocitizenship, but here we can plainly see that the constitution of subjects through biosociality is not restricted to biomedicinal discourse, but is also dependent upon juridical technologies. Boltanski's concept of the technofetus can help clarify our thoughts on these matters (2004) . The technofetus emerges from the new medical technologies of conception (in vitro fertilization) and imaging (fetal visualization) and from the juridical technologies that regulate these beings.
The technofetus has a central place in both the abortion debates and in the discussions regarding anencephalic fetuses, touched upon below. It also is central to the debates regarding the status of extra-corporal embryos, which in turn involves assisted reproduction and research with embryo stem cells.
The background to these controversies is the individualist configuration of values that is characteristic of modern Western cosmology and which, for the purposes of this article, we understand according to the works of Dumont. In modern individualist societies, the human being is the atomic, indivisible element, represented as a biological, thinking subject. Each human being is incarnate and humanity as a whole is the measure of all things. Society is the means and each individual life is the ends. Equality and liberty are central ideas to modern life and presuppose, in principle, the existence of the human individual. Each individual carries the essence of humanity. The individual is almost sacred and his/her rights are limited by the identical rights of other individuals (Dumont, 1997) . The individual is a moral being, independent and autonomous. Essentially asocial, he is the vessel and vehicle of the supreme values (equality and liberty) and occupies pride of place in the modern ideology of humanity and society (Dumont, 1992) . One cannot speak of biological citizenship or in biosexuality if there is no prior concept of the modern subject as an individual.
In the controversies regarding abortion or research with extracorporal embryos, the inherent rights of subjects are juxtaposed. On the one hand, we have women's prerogative to control their own body; on the other, rights attributed to fetuses and embryos, independent of the context in which they are found. Fetuses and embryos become represented as autonomous subjects, as if they could dispense with a uterus and continue developing and existing. In the first case, the rights of patients who are the potential beneficiaries of stem cell research are set against the rights of the frozen embryos. Here, we will examine the petition for and judgment of ADI 3510 and the public hearings regarding these processes. In defense of the right to life, we find such actors as the Catholic Church and other religious segments, pro-life movements, associated scientists and jurists. Questioning this right, we find feminist movements, liberal jurists, scientists in favor of embryonic stem cell research and (in the religious field) the non-governmental organization (NGO) Catholics for Choice. After presenting all the stages of the ADI 3510 debate, the article will then analyze the public hearings surrounding ADPF 54. We will then compare and contrast both lines of argumentation in our 2 According to the Federal Supreme Court's juridical glossary, an Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade (ADI) is an "act that has as its goal the declaration that a law or part of a law is unconstitutional; in other words, against the Federal Constitution. The ADI is one of those instruments jurists call 'a concentrated control of the constitutionality of the laws'. In other words, in theory, it is the direct contestation of legal norms". The entities and people who can propose this act include: the President of the Republic, the Chair of the Federal Senate, the Chair of the Chamber of Deputies. The chair of a legislative assembly or of the Federal District's legislative chamber, any state governor or the governor of the federal district, the Attorney General of the Republic, the federal council of the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil), anyn political party with representatives in the National Congress, any national-level labor organization. Available at: http: //www.stf.jus. br/portal/glossario/verVerbete.asp?letra=A&id=481 Acessed on 12/29/2014. 3 According to the Federal Supreme Court's juridical glossary, an Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (ADPF) is "a type of action, exclusively judged by the Federal Supreme Court, which has as its goal the avoidance or repair of damage to a fundamental precept, resulting from the act of some public power. In this case, it is said that the ADPF is an autonomous action. However, this type of action can also be equivalent in nature to the ADIs, given that it can question the constituionality of a norm using the Federal Constitution (in this case the pre-1988 constitution). ADPFs are regulated by Federal Law #9.882/99. The same powers that might enact an ADI can enact an ADPF. Available at: http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/glossario/verVerbete.asp?letra=A&id=481 . Acessed on 12/29/2014. conclusion. Values regarding autonomy, human dignity, and the right to life are central to this debate.
ADI 3510
Article 5 of Brazil's biosecurity law authorizes the extraction of stem cells from human embryos created for assisted reproduction, which are not viable, or which had been frozen for three or more years at the time the law was passed, with the "genitors'" (sic) permission. Congress passed the law Catholic Church entered into the case as an interested party, from the beginning. -human life begins at fertilization: the zygote is generated by the meeting of 23 masculine and 23 feminine chromosomes;
The Initial Petition
-it begins at fertilization, and because human life is continuous, it develops; -it continues to develop because the zygote, made up of a single cell, immediately produces human proteins and enzymes and is totipotent, meaning that it gives the embryonic human being the ability to form all of the human body's tissues, which differentiate and renew themselves, becoming a unique and unrepeatable human being.
-beginning with fertilization, the mother takes in the zygote and, from that point on, provides the environment for its development, an environment which is, in its final stage, the uterus. It is not, however, the uterus which becomes pregnant but the entire woman, at the moment of fertilization. (p. 10-11) These arguments are employed to establish that an embryo is a human being and that Article 5 of the biosecurity law thus violates the right to life and breaks the foundation upon which the democratic rule of law resides: the preservation of human dignity.
The petition and its justification are grounded in biological data in order to demonstrate the status of the human embryo as a person and as a human life. This is the "individual" described by Dumont (1992) as an asocial and autonomous being, the atomic reference of value in modern western culture.
Uniqueness and autonomy characterize this zygote as an individual.
The hearing with the scientists
Attending to the petition's proposal, the case's relator in front of the one including those chosen to testify by the Attorney General of the Republic and the CNBB and the other suggested by those "accused by the Movement to Declare as Unconstitutional": "the National Congress, the President of the Republic and friends of the Court". According to the case's sponsor, the hearing's goal was to seek "a jurisdictional concept for the word 'life'" and for the expression "human dignity".
Examining the trajectories of both groups of specialists, we can see that the greater part of those against the use of embryonic stem cells in research were involved with the institutions of the Catholic Church. This is not surprising, given that the CNBB helped to choose the invited specialists who were to testify.
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The synthesis presented below focuses on the arguments regarding the condition of the embryo in the laboratory, principally with regards to questions about whether or not it is a life or a person. Here, we will pay special attention to the underlying ideologies informing these arguments. 6 The discourses allow us to understand how these bioentities or somatic identities actually emerge. 7 The values of modern Western individualist ideology could be identified in both groups of expert speakers. The life of an embryo was understood to be sacred as are the rights of individuals in Western ideology (cf. Dumont, 1997) . The block opposed to the use of embryos in research surrounded itself with biological arguments and refuted other biology-based arguments offered up by the block that favored research. Both groups understood nature to be the foundation stone of reality (Laqueur, 1992) 8 . The group that questioned the biosecurity law made great use of bioethical discourses.
Those in favor of it adopted a relativistic discourse, preoccupied with the dynamics and consequences of research while their opponents' strongest argument had to do with the sacredness of life and the rejection of relativism in the face of sacred realities. However, this group also based their definition of the statute on biological markers.
We analyzed the Lattes CV (the official CV all Brazilian scientists maintain with the Federal Government) of all the people invited to give testimony. Where this CV did not existed, we searched for similar data via the internet. With regards to scientific production and participation in research with stem cells, it was discovered that the group in favor of research using embryonic stem cells was composed (except for the anthropologist) of researchers engaged in stem cell studies, many with quite impressive scientific credentials. In the group that was against the researchers, there were few who had participated in stem cell research. The arguments of these individuals thus centered on the positive results obtained with therapies conducted using adult stem cells -research in large part undertaken by members of the first group. The scientific production of the second group was much less in comparison with that of the first group and many of the second group's members were engaged in issues of bioethics.
6
This hearing is described in Luna (2010b) .
7
Bioentities are somatic entities constituted through emphasizing procedures involving bodily, medical, esthetic and hygienic care (Ortega, 2003) .
8
Laqueur identifies the emergence of a new episteme in illuminism whereby nature is understood as the bedrock foundation of reality. "Biology -the stable, ahistoric and sexed body -is understood to be the epistemological foundation of prescriptions for social order" (1992, p. 6).
The group which opposed the research attempted to fuse the concepts of life and personhood, creating a base for their arguments. They considered the human embryo to be a living being in an initial stage of life, based on the fact that certain vital biological processes. These were understood to represent true human existence and thus establish the embryo as a human person with all due legal rights. The concept of life itself is taken from biography (cf. Waldby, 2002) 9 and is sacralized. The anti-research group wanted to establish fertilization as the natural beginning of human life, in contrast to other biological referents which might be used but which were accused of being arbitrary.
Some of the specialists of the group that favored the use of embryos in research got around the definition of life by considering its conceptualization to be a "false problem" or an unanswerable question. A smaller number of specialists proposed the establishment of the nervous system as the beginning of life, looking to the already established medical definition of "brain death". The embryo's viability was also contextualized as life inside the mother. Some considered this relationship to be the beginning of human life. The non-viability of the embryos used in research was also repeatedly touched upon, and it was pointed out that this would eliminate their human character as established by the opposing group. The tiny size of the embryos was also employed as a rhetorical tactic to negate their status as people.
Three distinct representations of the embryos could be found in the proresearch group. The first emphasized continued vital processes instead of individual biography or, in the words of Waldby, a "raw biological vitality" (Waldby, 2002) 10 The second focused on the embryo's relationship with the environment that allowed it to continue to exist (Fyfe, 1991) 11 : in other words, its relationship to the mother, which guaranteed its condition as a person 9 Those who opposed embryonic stem cell research understood an embryo's life as biographical: the beginning point of a human narrative which should be allowed to follow its social course (Waldby, 2002, p. 313) 10 For those who defended research with embryos, the embryo's life was a form of raw biological vitality. The embryo is not killed in this view of things. Rather, its vitality is re-channeled and reorganized (Waldby, 2002, p. 313) .
11 In his analysis of abortion legislation in England between 1803 and 1967, Fyfe reveals a gradual separation of the fetus from its mother and the emergence of the concept of fetal viability (i.e. its capacity to be born alive). During this period, then, the fetus was redefined in the terms of medical knowledge as a limiting point for the classification of crimes. (Salem, 1997) 12 . The third representation focused upon the emergence of the nervous system, both as the parameter for brain death (and thus, presumably, for birth) and as the first sign of rationality (Luna, 2010b) or sensibility (Salem, 1997) . The anti-research group wanted to make the juridical, political and biological definitions of an embryo coincide with the concept of personhood, with this status being conceded to the embryo from the moment of fertilization. On the other side of the debate, Debora Diniz claimed that it was incorrect to believe that a biological phenomenon -in this case, fertilization -could be sufficient to decide moral questions such as how embryos are to be handled. Appeals to nature were present on both sides of the debate and I will explore these in more depth below. Right now, I want to argue that the use of biological references in order to define what is a person is related to the circulation of the identity terms that Rabinow (1999) explores, as well as the notion of biological citizenship: the sacredness of human life is emphasized at all times (Dworkin, 2003; Fassin, 2009) . Subjects emerge through juridical and biomedical technological apparatuses in the cases studies here, exactly as these authors point out.
Judgment and the justiceial vote
The He contrasted the rights of an embryo and the right to life of people who had incurable diseases (p.4).
Justice Gilmar Mendes thought it unnecessary to discuss the points where human life begins and ends for the purposes of legal protection (p.5).
These points were not yet clear and there was no consensus about them in scientific, religious, philosophical, or vulgar thought. He concluded that in the debates regarding euthanasia, abortion and research with embryos, there were no morally correct, universally acceptable answers (p.6). Mendes also observed that it is not necessary for one to be a subject of rights in order for one's life to be protected by the law (p.6).
Relativization of the debate about when life begins
In the opinion of the relator, Justice Carlos Britto, the beginning of human life coincides with the instant of fertilization (p.35). However, this justice also observed that "the beginning of life is a reality that is set apart were all based on physical markers of development that are characteristic of the constitution of the person in modern western cosmology (cf. Conklin and Morgan, 1996) . 14 Marco Aurelio also distinguished between stem cell research using embryos and abortion (p.6-7). Article 5 of the bio-security law specifies that viability is not an issue, because the embryos in question would never be implanted in a uterus and the only ones to be used will be those which have 14 Both sides of the abortion debate tend to seek fixed markers and structures in order to define when personhood begins. The irreversible nature of these criteria makes the question of whether or not a fetus is a person an "all or nothing" affair. If the fetus is even in the slightest considered to be a person, it has rights. The condition of personhood in this debate is, in any case, always established by recourse to biology (Conklin and Morgan, 1996, p. 660, 665) been frozen for three years or are otherwise not viable (p.8). In this view of things, the beginning of life presumes not only fertilization, but viability, which does not exist without pregnancy (p.9). According to this justice, "it is controversial to claim that the constitution protects life in general, or even in utero life in any phase of existence" (p.9) and he brought up the example of abortions permitted to save the mother's life (p.9) or to end pregnancies Justice Cezar Peluso took an different position from the others by defending the thesis that life does not exist in frozen human embryos. In his deposition, he defines as "theoretical subjects of the right to life" the following categories: frozen embryos, implanted embryos and the fetus and adult humans or human children who carry those attributes understood by the constitutional order to signify the quality of personhood (p.9). Peluso looked at whether there different degrees of constitutional protection for "people actually given life in all its plenitude" and embryos (p.9) and concluded that the frozen embryo only participates to a very basic degree in the protections given to the human dignity of human adults (p.9). The object of the court's tutelary power with regards to life is only the life of a human person. The justice criticized the argument of the anti-research faction that life can be defined as the continuous development of the life cycle from the embryonic stage on: this did not apply to frozen embryos (p.27). According to Peluso, the life cycle perspective "does not consider or depreciates the biological function and the corresponding juridical-normative condition... of the female uterus" (p.25) which, to the justice's mind, was reduced by the petitioners to the status of "an adequate environment" and "source of necessary nutrients" for fetal development. "Intra-uterine life also has constitutional value" (p.26).
The implantation of the fertilized egg in the uterus is a condition of its development and constitutes the criterion for the definition of the beginning of life.
The beginning of life at fertilization, understood as a fact
Three justices argued that life begins at fertilization and affirmed that life and personhood began at the same time. The three defended the thesis 
ADPF 54
In Below, I will outline core themes from the exhibitions. These reveal their origins in a common configuration of values, although their arguments are presented in symmetrical fashion. These themes are: life; the relationship between life, anencephaly and brain death; the human condition; dignity; autonomy/choice; disability, eugenics, and degrees of anencephaly; technical descriptions of anencephaly; the right to life; the right of mothers/families; other rights; the contrast between abortion and therapeutic anticipation of delivery; maternal risk and suffering; the secular state. In general, questions revolved around whether or not anencephalic fetuses could be considered to be living human beings and whether they were thus due rights or not.
Luis Roberto Barroso, a lawyer who represented the National Confederation of Health Workers, presented seven theses in order to synthesize the case at the end of the hearings. Using these, one can identify the main axes that directed the debate:
1. The 100% certainty of the diagnosis of anencephaly and its irreversibility.
2. Anencephaly's 100% mortality rate. Barroso refrains from commenting on the case of "Marcela" considering it to be exceptional 17.
.
Gestation of anencephalic fetus is a risk to women's physical and mental
health.
4. The absence in Brazil of any record of anencephalic fetuses organs being used in transplants. Such transplants are not feasible because the other organs of the fetus may carry defects.
5. Barroso proposes to treat the interruption of anencephalic pregnancy as the therapeutic anticipation of delivery and not as abortion, given that the fetuses are brain dead and the criterion for death under Brazilian law is brain death.
Given that anencephalic fetuses are not really alive, they cannot be aborted and their removal is a therapeutic procedure.
6. The difference between anencephaly and physical deficiency, given that there are no anencephalic children or adults, and the lack of relationship with other humans in the case of anencephaly. Barroso classifies arguments relating to eugenics in this context "empty rhetoric"
7. In view of the testimony of the women who opted for therapeutic anticipation of delivery and of others refused, and given that both groups 17 This is the case of Marcela de Jesus, a girl diagnosed with anencephaly who survived for one year and eight months. Her mother decided to carry her pregnancy to term and is seen as an example by the Catholic Church , receiving support from this institution. Pro-life experts used this example to argue that there are degrees of anencephaly, corresponding to different prognoses for life and that these degrees are impossible to detect with ultrasound . Therefore, pregnancies involving anencephalic fetuses should not be terminated. Some prochoice experts believed that Marcela was not anencephalic, however, but suffered from merocrania, a more rare anomaly which allows for longer survival and which is subject to intrauterine identification. This distinction was discussed by several speakers during the hearings. 
In defence of life
Those speakers opposed to early delivery of anencephalic fetuses argued that these possessed human life and that they thus needed to be defended and preserved. According to Father Luiz Antônio Bento, one of the CNBB representatives, individual life is "an unalienable personal good" but also "a social good that belongs to all". As such, it's society's obligation to "defend and promote these rights of the human person, of the fetus that has this Association is original in that it invokes the authority of science, and not that 18 The four sessions were transcribed as separate documents and, for this reason, I present the page numbers with the date of the session.
19 She cites the book Darwin's Black Box, which argues for intelligent planning (also known as intelligent design), according to which celular structure and functions follow an efficient plan. The book seeks to demonstrate that Darwin's theory of natural selection does not explain the origins of these structures and that the way in which these structures are arranged could only be part of a planned act (see a critical review of this book in Martins, 2001 ): this would be the superior intelligence that Doctor Marlene Nobre refers to. Notions of life or vital force are frequently connected to belief in the supernatural, the divine and the sacred and these understandings are made more explicit in relation to death. These attributes characterize both the Judeo-Christian and classical understanding of life. According to the first of these traditions, life is interpreted and valued as a gift from God (Franklin, 1995 (Franklin, , p. 1346 .
21 According to Salem: "it is the gens which, substituting 'blood' or the biological, now appear embodying a reality that came before human designs, or an essential truth that imposes itself upon the superficial appearances of culture" (1995, p. 66) .
is counter-indicated, as well as their use for organ transplants" (em 26 th of august, p. 29). The physical presence of characteristics that were earlier understood to be part of the spirit or the mind, such as consciousness, refers to the concept of physicalism: "the belief that corporeality in itself is a self-explaining dimension of human being" (Duarte, 1999, p. 25) . The protection of the anencephalic fetuses supposedly demand on account of their biological characteristics illustrates the concept of biocitizenship (Petryna, 2004 Rose and Novas, 2005) . The attribution of rights here occurs through legal devices that create a technofetus (Boltanski, 2004) and which are integrated into networks of circulation of identity in terms of biosociality.
Pro-choice
The same themes were repeated among the speakers in favor of ADPF 54, although with opposite approaches. The concept of life was symmetrically associated with brain death, the defining mark of death in Brazilian law. José
Aristodemo Pinotti, a professor of obstetrics and gynecology and a federal Congressman (Democrats -Democratas; DEM) said: "An anencephalic fetus has no brain, no potential for life " (28 th of august, p.42). Similarly, Rafael
Thomaz Gollop (SBPC, gynecologist and obstetrician) noted that: "The anencephalic fetus is a brain dead but has a heartbeat and is breathing.... It has no cortical activity... [and] has is only in a state of vegetative survival"
(28 th of august, pp.54s). The representation of the anencephalic fetus is that of an ambiguous figure: a dead body that is nevertheless breathing and demonstrating a heartbeat. 22 According to Lia Zanotta Machado (Feminist Health Network -Rede Feminista de Saúde -and senior anthropology professor), there would not "even be any legal interests to consider" because the expected child will not legally appear (4 th september). Gollop quotes the CFM resolution on brain death, applying it to anencephalic fetuses: "Infraspinal signs of reactivity -ie., breathing and heartbeat -do not prevent a diagnosis associated with the presence of rationality or consciousness, characterizes the human person. The overall lethality of anencephaly was affirmed in order to refute the claims that terminating these pregnancies was a denial of the right to life and discrimination due to disability. Rabinow points to the circulation of terms of identity and sites of restriction in the constitution of biosociality (1999, p. 143) . In the case of anencephaly, we can see the restriction in terms of the denying anencephalic fetuses identity as living human beings due to their not being expected to live (not being viable) and also due to their lack of awareness and rationality. The pro-choice position questioned the biolegitimacy of anencephalic fetuses: if there is no viability, there is no value to life, nor could one speak of biological citizenship.
The absence of the potential for life justifies the avoidance of the use of the term "abortion": there would be no interruption of pregnancy if the fetus was already dead. Since the fetus was "stillborn" the procedure to remove it would be properly known as the "therapeutic anticipation of delivery in order to save the mother's life", or so concludes Talvane "God gives every human free will. We argue that in these cases, the will of the woman undergoing these circumstances should prevail" (26 th of august, 2) Access to the progress of science, as included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, given that ultrasound can diagnose fetal anencephaly at 12 weeks after conception (4 th september).
24 The cardinal points of the ideology of modern western society are equality and liberty and the presumption of the unifying principle of the human individual, with each individual representing the essence of humanity. The individual is "almost sacred, absolute; nothing exists beyond his legitimate exigencies; his rights are only limited by the identical rights of other individuals" (Dumont, 1997, p. 53) . According to this view, society is nothing more than a collection of these monads. that the diagnosis of anencephaly occurs around the third month of pregnancy. By contrast, the only reference to replication in ADI 3510 is indirect:
surplus embryos from assisted reproductive that might serve as stem cell sources. The "genitors" who provided the germ material would not generally have reproductive use for it in this case, given that they had released their embryos to research after freezing them for three years.
The justification for the extraction of embryonic stem cells, (a procedure that involves embryo destruction) is that this might advance scientific knowledge and also allow for the creation of tissue replacement therapies.
Political movements formed by patients are betting on these cells as a hope for a cure. Use of the embryos would thus benefit third parties. This argument is even used by those who oppose the use of embryos in research. Both the scientists at the ADI 3510 public hearing as well as the three justices who took part in it questioned this use of embryonic stem cells, on the grounds that this would transform embryos into a means while Kantian ethics clearly states that human beings are an end in and of themselves. The rationale for therapeutic early delivery of anencephalic fetuses, on the other hand, is that this would reduce the suffering of the mother and her family, given that they are aware of the lethal diagnosis.
In the public debates looked at here, we can identify three types of movements that attempt to constitute and support social subjects: the movement of patients who seek the right to health through biotechnological investment in such things as research into stem cells; the feminist movement, which defends women's autonomy in deciding about questions regarding reproduction; and finally there is the pro-life movement, which defends the right to life of embryos and fetuses and mobilizes against any form of abortion and manipulation of human embryos, whether in in vitro fertilization or in stem cell research. We can thus see, in the words of Rabinow, that we are dealing here with the "formation of new identities and individual and group practices that have emerged from these new identities" (1999, p. 147) . We also see displayed the individualizing and collectivizing aspects of biocitizenship (Rose and Novas, 2005) : collectivizing with regards to the formation of these movements that mobilize around the rights of fetuses or embryos, women and patients: individualizing with regards to the recognition of somatic identities, such as the unique genetic identity of an embryo in a laboratory or the identity of anencephalic fetuses as representative of human biodiversity.
It is precisely this individuality that, in the pro-life perspective, make both fetuses and embryos the subjects of rights.
In the discussions surrounding ADPF 54, the figure of the mother repeatedly appeared as one of the principal protagonists of the case. Here, we saw a clash between two subjects of rights: the pregnant women and the anencephalic fetus. It was discussed whether or not early delivery was justifiable in these cases, which would mean ending of life process of the anencephalic fetus in order to reduce the mother's suffering. Pro-life arguments situated the fetus' right to life in relation to the mother's suffering in such a way that the prerogatives of the fetus encompassed the mother's right to well-being.
Those who favored the pro-choice approach argued that there was no reason to protect a totally nonviable fetus that had next to zero life expectancy outside of the womb. The context of the ADI 3510 was different precisely because issues regarding pregnancy weren't involved. Scientists opposed to the use of embryos in research referred to the mother only in order to affirm the autonomy of the embryo in relation to her, accentuating the embryo's capacity to develop by itself in accordance with its genetic programing.
Those who favored to the use of embryos in research attempted to shift the debate away from issues related to abortion in order to avoid issues of illegal- They argued that life is a process in which the gametes that originated in the embryo are already living cells. The quality of "living" cannot thus be attached to an individualized embryo, which needs to be implanted in a uterus in order to develop into a life. Finally, the pro-research side emphasized relativistic positions, saying that beliefs vary from religion to religion and culture to culture. The pro-research side also compared the condition of the supposedly live embryo in the lab to that of the really, truly live patients who were in dire need of the therapeutic techniques which stem cell research could develop. Why were the lives of these real human beings less important than the notional life of an embryo? In the debates surrounding ADPF 54, the efforts of the pro-life side were concentrated on showing that anencephalic fetuses were, in fact, alive while the pro-choice side refuted this alleging brain death. They claimed that in the absence of a juridical interest that needed to be protected (life), therapeutic early delivery could not in any way be considered abortion. In this flow of biological and legal meanings which establish social identities, we can clearly see examples of Rabinow's claim (1999) that nature is reshaped through culture and becomes artificial.
In the debates surrounding ADPF 54 as the ADI 3510, it is questioned whether or not the in vitro embryos and anencephalic fetuses are people, with all the rights and obligations attending to this status. The representation in both cases is that of the individual as described by Dumont (1992) : an asocial, atomic being disconnected from any relationship. The frequent deletion of the mother from theses debates is due to the emphasis given to the fetus or embryo.
Here we find the value of life itself being debated: is human life sacred?
The sacredness of life is a relevant question for lawyer and legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, who distinguishes it from personhood, and also for anthro- 
